The presidents have also reaffirmed the power to unilaterally withdraw from agreements between Congress and the executive branch, but there is a scientific debate about the extent to which the Constitution allows the president to act in such circumstances without legislative approval. Some scholars claim that the president has the power, unilaterally withdrawing from the executive agreements of Congress, although he is not allowed to end the domestic effects of a law implementing laws.194 But others argue that Congress must approve the end of executive agreements that confer exclusive powers on Congress, such as power over international trade. , and which have obtained congressional approval after being concluded by the executive branch.195 Although this debate is still developing.195 Although this debate is still developing. , the president`s unilateral end to the executive agreements of Congress has not been the subject of much litigation, and previous studies have concluded that such a denunciation has not generated much opposition from the legislature.196 See z.B. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415 (debate on the “executive agreements for the settlement of the rights of U.S. nationals against foreign governments” of the year 179); Act of February 20, 1792, No. 26, 1 Stat. 239 (law passed by the Second Congress for the approval of post-linked executive agreements). Congressional efforts to curb the practice of executive agreements and stem the tide of unilateralism have been largely unsuccessful.
The first and most important effort came in 1951, when Senator John Bricker proposed a constitutional amendment to limit the use and impact of executive agreements and treaties within the United States. Bricker Amendment supporters, including the leaders of the American Bar Association, found virtue in the proposal for a variety of reasons. Some, as Alexander DeConde explained, “have become angry at executive agreements like Yalta`s” and have tried to reduce the president`s unilateralism on foreign policy. Others feared the impact of treaties such as the United Nations Charter, the Genocide Convention and the United Nations draft peace on human rights within the United States. Still others supported them as a useful “isolationist” response to “the internationalism of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected the amendment on the grounds that it would obstruct the presidency`s conduct of foreign policy. In a letter to his brother Edgar, a lawyer who supported the resolution, Eisenhower said it would “paralyze the executive to the point of disempowering us in world politics.” The Eisenhower administration was well aware that most Republicans accepted the proposal and that its opposition was therefore carefully measured.
After failing to reach a compromise with Bricker troops, Eisenhower sought the support of Democrats in the Senate. Georgian Senator Walter George introduced his own amendment, which confirmed the constitutional supremacy over treaties and executive agreements. In a key passage that reflected widespread opposition to the widespread use of unilateral executive agreements, De George`s proposal would have necessitate the implementation of legislation on executive agreements (but not for treaties) in the United States. The Eisenhower administration was strongly committed to defeating the Bricker and George proposals, in part because the councillors believed they would remove important prerogatives from the president and transfer foreign affairs authority from the executive to the legislature. The Bricker Amendment was defeated by 50 votes to 42 in the Senate on February 25, 1954. But George`s amendment did better; it was only one vote below the two-thirds required for probate.